Designing economic mechanisms /
A mechanism is a mathematical structure that models institutions through which economic activity is guided and coordinated. There are many such institutions; markets are the most familiar ones. Lawmakers, administrators and officers of private companies create institutions in order to achieve desire...
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Other Authors: | |
Format: | eBook |
Language: | English |
Published: |
Cambridge ; New York :
Cambridge University Press,
2006.
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Subjects: | |
Online Access: | CONNECT CONNECT |
Summary: | A mechanism is a mathematical structure that models institutions through which economic activity is guided and coordinated. There are many such institutions; markets are the most familiar ones. Lawmakers, administrators and officers of private companies create institutions in order to achieve desired goals. They seek to do so in ways that economize on the resources needed to operate the institutions, and that provide incentives that induce the required behaviors. This book presents systematic procedures for designing mechanisms that achieve specified performance, and economize on the resources required to operate the mechanism. The systematic design procedures are algorithms for designing informationally efficient mechanisms. Most of the book deals with these procedures of design. When there are finitely many environments to be dealt with, and there is a Nash-implementing mechanism, our algorithms can be used to make that mechanism into an informationally efficient one. Informationally efficient dominant strategy implementation is also studied. |
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Physical Description: | 1 online resource (ix, 344 pages) : illustrations |
Bibliography: | Includes bibliographical references (pages 335-340) and index. |
ISBN: | 0511219008 9780511219009 0521836417 9780521836418 9780511220999 0511220995 9780511754258 0511754256 1280480297 9781280480294 0511220480 9780511220487 1107161452 9781107161450 0511308965 9780511308963 0511219687 9780511219689 9780521724104 0521724104 |